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Abstract
We develop a new approach to directly and strictly distinguish indecisiveness from
indiﬀerence. In our approach experimental subjects face a list of pairs of options.
Besides the standard choice of choosing one option out of the pair (the binary choice),
we also allow experimental subjects to randomize over the two options by choosing
probabilities according to which either option determines the payoﬀs (the random-
ized choice). Furthermore, we elicit subjects' willingness to pay (WTP) of using the
randomized choice via a modiﬁed multiple price list method. We show that subjects
might strictly prefer the randomized choice over the binary choice when they are inde-
cisive. Our results suggest that (1) the vast majority of subjects randomized actively;
(2) subjects took longer time to make strictly randomized decisions; (3) subjects were
willing to pay a strictly positive amount of money to randomize, and they were willing
to pay more for randomized choices with randomizing probabilities close to 0.5 than
those with randomizing probabilities close to 0 or 1. These results provide strong
evidence for the existence of indecisiveness in choices. More importantly, it suggests
that there might exist signiﬁcant welfare losses when indecisive individuals are forced
to make all-or-nothing decisions against their potentially incomplete preferences.
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1 Introduction
Indecisiveness is a widely observed phenomenon in real life with yet little economic studies
of its existence and implications. In a standard economic setting, an individual is often
assumed to have complete preferences and hence no avenue is provided for the individual
to express his indecisiveness. As a result, indecisiveness is often masked and/or treated
as indiﬀerence. Such identiﬁcation problem exists in all elicitation technique which relies
on indiﬀerence, such as in studies to measure time discount rates in inter-temporal choices
(see, e.g., the references in Frederick et al., 2002), to obtain the valuation of a good (see
e.g., Andersen et al., 2006), to estimate risk attitudes (Holt and Laury, 2002), and to
assess probability estimates (Trautmann and Kuilen, 2015). Since indecisiveness is not an
anomaly or error, its denial has extensive implications. Confusing indecisiveness with indif-
ference could lead to measurement biases in the estimation of time preferences, valuations,
risk attitudes, and probability estimates. More generally, there might exist signiﬁcant wel-
fare losses when indecisive individuals are forced to make all-or-nothing decisions against
their true, potentially incomplete preferences.
The primary objective of this paper is to provide a mechanism for individuals to express in-
decisiveness and to allow us to strictly discriminate indecisiveness from indiﬀerence through
individuals' choices. Our focus is on the type of indecisiveness that arises from distinct
conﬂicting underlying motives facing an individual (Levi, 1986; Dubra et al., 2004; Eliaz
and Ok, 2006), and its resultant indecisive behavior as deliberate randomization (Agranov
and Ortoleva, 2017). We study indecisiveness in an ultimatum game with a novel design.
We choose the ultimatum game as a working horse for its receiver is known for facing
distinct conﬂicting motives: to maximize own gains versus to be treated fairly. These mo-
tives correspond nicely to the diﬀerent utility functions that individuals may have when
they have incomplete preferences (Dubra et al., 2004; Eliaz and Ok, 2006). We exploit the
presence of these conﬂicting motives to study the prevalence and welfare implications of
2
indecisiveness.
In an ultimatum game, a proposer oﬀers a payoﬀ distribution, and a receiver can decide to
accept or reject the oﬀer (binary choice). Both receives the proposed payoﬀ distribution
when the receiver accepts, and both receive zero when the receive rejects. We depart from
the standard ultimatum game by allowing receivers to combine the two choices and build a
randomized choice in addition to making the standard binary choice (accept or reject). In
addition, we also asked receivers for their willingness to pay (WTP) to use the randomized
choice instead of the  free  binary choice to determine their ﬁnal payoﬀ. This helps us
to rule out cheap talk in utilizing randomized choices and to establish the presence of
welfare gains from allowing indecisiveness, if any. We show that all important models of
complete preferences predict no strictly randomized choices, let alone paying to use them.
However, when subjects have incomplete preferences and would like to complete them using
rules as those in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) or in Qiu (2015), they may strictly prefer
the randomized choices over the binary choice. In Section 3 we oﬀer a concrete example
to illustrate this point.
We have three main ﬁndings. First, the vast majority of subjects (over 90%) made ran-
domized choices. Among those who randomized, they randomized for half of the possible
allocations (53% of the allocations on average). The extensive use of randomized choice
suggests that complete preferences are rare in scenarios involving conﬂicting motives, such
as the ultimatum game, and indecisiveness is a common human behavior that should not
be neglected.
Second, subjects took signiﬁcantly longer time to make strictly randomized decisions than
to make decisions in which the randomized probability is 0 or 1. This result is consistent
with indecisive behavior rather than indiﬀerence. When subjects are indiﬀerent towards
options, they would spend less time on the decision because the choices are equally attrac-
tive and time is costly. In contrast, when subjects are indecisive towards an allocation, they
would spend more time to contemplate on the allocation as they face conﬂicting motives,
which is supported by our results.
Finally, we ﬁnd that subjects were willing to pay a strictly positive amount of money to
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randomize, and they were willing to pay more for randomized choices which have random-
izing probabilities close to 0.5 than those with randomizing probabilities close to 0 or 1.
This ﬁnding is important because it not only shows that the randomized choices are delib-
erate and meaningful rather than cheap talk, it also shows that there are beneﬁts to the
subjects from being allowed to make randomized choices. Together, the result reinforces
the earlier point that indecisiveness is a common human behavior, and providing a channel
that allows people to express indecisiveness is welfare enhancing.
Our paper relates to studies on incomplete preferences and indecisiveness. Danan and
Ziegelmeyer (2006) found that subjects postponed choices even when postponing was costly,
and they interpreted a preference for ﬂexibility - postponing choices  as an evidence
for indecisiveness. In Agranov and Ortoleva (2017), subjects facing the same choice set
deliberately randomize (choosing one option in some choices and choosing another option
in other choices) even though they were told that the same choices were repeated three
times. Dwenger et al. (2014) found that decision makers sometimes preferred delegating
the decision to an external random device, e.g., a coin ﬂip. In a similar vein, Cettolin and
Riedl (2015) allowed subjects to select an indiﬀerence option in addition to choosing one
option out of the two options. When the indiﬀerence option was chosen, the choice was
delegated to a fair random device, e.g., a coin ﬂip. Choosing indiﬀerence option multiple
times was interpreted as an evidence for indecisiveness. They found that about half of the
subjects can be attributed to have incomplete preferences.
Our paper is an improvement over previous attempts to distinguish indiﬀerence and indeci-
siveness in three ways. First, our subjects choose their own probabilities of randomization
between the two options, instead of using an exogenously given random device, e.g., ﬂip-
ping a coin. We believe it reduces some confounding eﬀects, e.g., the possibility of regret
aversion that could be present in Dwenger et al. (2014) and Cettolin and Riedl (2015).1
Second, in the ultimatum game, the receiver's payoﬀ following acceptance or rejection is
certain, hence the randomized choice is a simple lottery. This allows for a more direct
1In Dwenger et al. (2014) and Cettolin and Riedl (2015) subjects are assumed to regret only over active
choices should those choices deliver bad consequences. Delegating choices to an external random device is
seen as a passive decision and thus involves no regret. Here the randomized choices are also active.
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identiﬁcation of indecisiveness. In contrast, the randomized choice becomes a compound
lottery when options are risky or ambiguous lotteries (as in e.g., Cettolin and Riedl, 2015).
To evaluate the randomized choice, we need some additional rules to reduce the compound
lottery. Violations from standard decision models could be due to either indecisiveness or
violations of rules to reduce compound lotteries. Third, we additionally elicit the WTP
for the use of randomized choices over the binary choices. Subjects need to pay a strictly
positive amount in order to implement the randomized choices to determine their ﬁnal
payoﬀs. Willingness to do so strictly discriminates indecisiveness from indiﬀerence. More
importantly, it demonstrates the welfare loss resulting from having to make all-or-nothing
decisions in the absence of a mechanism which allows them to express their indecisiveness.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reports the experimental design. Section 3
derives the benchmark solutions under all major decision theories. Experimental results
are reported in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 discusses some important implications and
concludes.
2 Experimental design
Our experiment is built on a (modiﬁed) ultimatum game with a proposer and a receiver
over the distribution of BC20. The experiment consists of three stages. Binary choices are
elicited in Stage 1. Subjects face two options and they pick one option out of the two. Stage
2 elicits randomized choices. Subjects are allowed to combine the two options from Stage
1 to build a randomized choice. Stage 3 elicits subjects' WTP. Having made the binary
choices and the randomized choices, subjects decide which choices they wish to implement
to determine their ﬁnal experimental payoﬀs. The use of binary choices is always free of
charge but subjects need to pay a fee if they wish to use the randomized choices.
We have chosen a symmetric design in which we elicit three choices  the binary choice,
the randomized choice, the willingness to pay for using the randomized choice  from
both the proposer and the receiver. Our focus is on the receiver. The receiver faces no
risk or uncertainty when deciding to accept or reject. This eliminates the possibility of
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indecisiveness due to multiple priors (Ok et al., 2012). The proposer, on the other hand,
faces strategic uncertainty of not knowing whether the receiver would accept or reject an
allocation, and the indecisiveness might also come from beliefs.
Below we explain the detailed procedure. Decision screens are provided in Appendix:
decision screens.
2.1 Binary choices
In Stage 1 we elicit subjects' binary choice via the strategy method (see, e.g., Selten,
1967; Brandts and Charness, 2011). The proposer faces a randomized sequence of pairs
of allocations. Each pair of allocation comprises of an equal allocation (BC10,BC10) and an
unequal allocation (BC20 − a,BCa), where a ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 9} is the payoﬀ of the receiver.
The proposer has to decide which of the two allocations to propose to the receiver. The
receiver is informed that the proposer will decide whether to propose an unequal allocation
or an equal allocation, and the receiver's decision is to decide whether to accept the oﬀer.
If the receiver accepts the allocation, the proposer and the receiver receive the proposed
allocation, and both receive BC0 if the receiver rejects the proposal. However, the receiver
has to decide whether to accept or reject all possible allocations that could be made by
the proposer before the proposer's actual allocation is revealed. In other words, between
two allocations, one equal and one unequal, the receiver has to decide whether to accept or
reject if the proposer proposes the unequal allocation. For completeness, the receiver is also
asked to decide, for any pair of allocations (BC10,BC10) and (BC20−a,BCa), a ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 9}
, whether to accept or reject if the proposer proposes the equal allocation.
2.2 Randomized choices
In Stage 2, both the proposer and the receiver are told that they can make a diﬀerent de-
cision for each pair of allocations. The receiver is told that, instead of choosing acceptance
or rejection, they can assign a probability, p, to acceptance and 1 − p to rejection, where
0 ≤ p ≤ 1 . The value of p is understood as the probability according to which payoﬀs
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are determined by acceptance or rejection. For example, if the receiver indicates a deci-
sion of (0.4, Acceptance; 0.6Rejection) for the unequal oﬀer, a random draw determines
that the proposed unequal allocation is accepted with a chance of 40% and is rejected
with a chance of 60%. The probabilities are in an increment of 10%, thus one can choose
p% = {0, 10%, 20%, 30%, ..., 100%}. When the slider is moved, the p under acceptance,
100−p% under rejection, and the p% above the slider change to reﬂect the decision. Figure
1 provides an illustration of the receiver's decision screen.
Similarly, the proposer, instead of choosing one allocation, can combine the two allocations.
The combination is done by assigning a probability that the proposer would like either
allocation to be proposed to the receiver. In the experiment subjects the slider to choose
the probability p of unequal allocation. The probabilities are in an increment of 10%.
Thus, one can choose p% = {0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, ..., 100%}. When the slider is moved, the
p% under Allocation 1, 100− p% under Allocation 2, and the p% above the slider change
to reﬂect the decision. Figure 12 in Appendix: decision screens provides an illustration of
the proposer's decision screen.
Our intent of having subjects make randomized choices after binary choices is to allow
subjects to see simple, binary choices before encountering the more complex situations. But
this gives subjects an opportunity to contemplate on their decisions, and, as a consequence,
it could improve the completeness of subjects' preferences. This reduces the possibility of
observing indecisive choices, and the evidence of indecisiveness would be stronger if we
observe it nonetheless. Thus, our design represents a conservative test of indecisiveness.
2.3 WTP
In Stage 3, one pair of allocations is randomly chosen by the computer for each subject. We
elicit subjects' WTPs for the random chosen pair by asking them how much they are willing
to pay to implement the randomized choice they have made earlier for that allocation pair.
Stating a willingness to pay of BC0 dollars will imply that they are unwilling to pay for the
randomized choices and prefer to implement the binary choices. On the contrary, stating
a positive WTP implies that subjects strictly prefer the randomized choices to the binary
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Figure 1: The elicitation of the receiver's randomized choices. The probabilities are in an
increment of 10%, p% = {0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, ..., 100%}. When the slider is moved, the
p% under Accept, 100 − p% under Reject, and the p% above the slider change to reﬂect
the decision.
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Figure 2: The decision screen of the elicitation of the receiver's WTP for the use of the
randomized choice. After subjects conﬁrm decisions for all rows, one row is randomly
chosen by the computer, and the preferred option at this row determines whether subjects'
randomized choice is implemented. The proposer's decision screen is similar, except that
the decision is about which allocation to propose.
choices and are hence willing to pay to implement them.
We elicit subjects' WTPs via a modiﬁed multiple price list method rather than the Becker,
De Groot and Marschak mechanism to avoid potential issues with the BDM mechanism
(Plott and Zeiler, 2005). Subjects face a table with 11 rows. In each row, subjects have
to decide whether to pay the stated fee to implement the randomized choice to determine
the ﬁnal payoﬀ, or not to pay the fee and to use the binary choice instead to determine
the ﬁnal payoﬀ. The fee ranges from BC0 to BC2, with an increment of BC0.2. Subjects are
told that one of the rows will be randomly chosen by the computer, and the chosen option
in that row determines whether subjects' randomized choices are implemented as well as
the corresponding fees for doing so.
Figure 2 illustrates the decision screen for the elicitation of the WTP for using the ran-
domized choice. In the experiment a revision screen appears after subjects click OK. In
the revision screen subjects can conﬁrm their choices or make adjustments.
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There are two WTPs for the receiver for the randomly chosen pair. The receiver is asked
for the WTP if the unequal allocation out of the pair is proposed, and, for completeness,
also the WTP if the equal allocation is proposed. We focus on the WTP conditional on
an unequal allocation.
Since subjects' WTPs depend on the randomized choices that were speciﬁed earlier, a
plausible concern is whether their randomized choice decisions are incentive compatible
(see e.g., the trade-oﬀ method in Qiu and Steiger, 2011). This concern does not exist in
our experimental design. To see this, one can apply a backward induction argument as
in extensive form games with complete information: given any randomized choices, our
modiﬁed multiple price list method elicits the player's true WTP, and given the incentive
compatible WTP after any randomized choices, it is the best interest of the receiver to
specify the optimal  in the sense of maximizing the receiver's decision utility based on
his or her decision model  randomized choice for any pair of allocations. Thus it is the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium for the receiver to construct the optimal randomized
choices for any pair of allocations in Stage 2 and reports the true WTP for the use of the
randomized choice for the randomly chosen pair of allocations in Stage 3.
The experiment was run in the DISCON lab in Radboud University. Recruitment was done
via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). We had 4 sessions with 100 subjects in total. The experiment
lasted about an hour, and the average payment was BC11.62.
3 Benchmark solutions
Consider a proposer who suggests an unequal payoﬀ distribution (20− a, a), where 20− a
stands for the payoﬀ of the proposer and a stands for the payoﬀ of the receiver. The
receiver decides whether to accept (denote by A) or reject (denote by R) the proposed
payoﬀ distribution. Below we derive benchmark solutions under the expected utility (EU)
theory , under some popular non-EU theories, and under models of incomplete preferences.
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3.1 Benchmark solutions under EUT and some popular non-EU theories
Prediction under EUT: p ∈ (0, 1) occurs only when subjects are indiﬀerent between A
and R, and WTP= 0 for all p.
Proof: This result follows directly from the independence axiom. Suppose A  R, then by
the independence axiom pA+ (1− λ)A  pR+ (1− p)A∇p ∈ (0, 1). A randomized choice
of A and R oﬀers no utility gain than the binary choice, and thus WTP= 0. The other
case A ≺ R can be shown similarly.
Prediction under some popular non-EU theories, such as (cumulative) prospect
theory, rank dependent utility theory (Quiggin, 1982), and Guls (1991) disap-
pointment aversion theory: Similar to EUT, p ∈ (0, 1) occurs only when subjects are
indiﬀerent between A and R, and WTP= 0 for all p.
Proof: The lottery (p,A; 1−p,R) which accepts the unequal payoﬀ distribution (20−a, a)
with probability p and rejects it with probability 1 − p is a binary prospect, and in the
evaluation of binary prospects, (cumulative) prospect theory, rank dependent utility theory
(Quiggin, 1982), and Guls (1991) disappointment aversion theory gives qualitatively the
same evaluation (Observation 7.11.1 in Wakker, 2010, p. 231). Below we illustrate the
proof under (cumulative) prospect theory. With a slight abuse of notations, let v(·) denote
the value function, V (·) denote the prospect value of a lottery, w(·) denote the probability
weighting function. Suppose A CPT R, where CPT denotes a strict preference relation
implied by CPT. Under CPT we haveV (A) = v[(20 − a, a)] > V (R) = v[(0, 0)]. Consider
now pA + (1 − p)R. By CPT we have V [pA + (1 − p)R] = w(p)v[(20 − a, a)] + [1 −
w(p)]v[(0, 0)] = v[(0, 0)] + w(p)[v[(20 − a, a)] − v[(0, 0)]]. Since w(p) increases with p, we
have p = 1 when A CPT R. Thus randomization oﬀers no gain and WTP= 0. The other
case R CPT A can be shown similarly.
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3.2 Benchmark solution under incomplete preferences
Indecisiveness could result from beliefs, i.e., multiple priors, or from tastes, i.e., multiple
utility functions (Ok et al., 2012). Indecisiveness from beliefs plays no role in our study,
and we focus on indecisiveness from tastes.
Speciﬁcally, let C be a compact metric space, and c ∈ C be an outcome. A risky lottery
l ∈ L is then a Borel probability measure over C. Let , an individual's preference over L.
Dubra et al. (2004) suggest that when individuals' preferences are incomplete, there exists
a set {uτ}τ∈Γ of real functions on L such that, for all lotteries l1 and l2,
l1  l2 ⇐⇒
∫
C
uτ (c) dl1 ≥
∫
C
uτ (c) dl2 ∇τ ∈ Γ.
The construction of an individual having a set of utility functions instead of a unique utility
function is related to the idea of multiple selfs within an individual that has conﬂicting
motives. The intra-personal conﬂict leads to diﬃculties in making a decision and hence
the incompleteness in preferences (Levi, 1986; Eliaz and Ok, 2006). When forced to make
a decision nonetheless, individuals apply rules to complete their incomplete preferences.
We consider the two models for such a completion: Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) and Qiu
(2015).
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) suggest a model in which any alternatives l is evaluated ac-
cording to the function V (·),
V (l) = infτ∈ΓCE(l, uτ ).
Thus individuals evaluate alternatives according to the utility function giving the lowest
certainty equivalent. They show that their representation can be derived from a cautious
completion of incomplete preferences (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015, page 693).
Qiu (2015) constructed a model with an axiomatic foundation that explicitly attempts to
complete incomplete preferences. His representation theorem states that, an alternative l
is evaluated as
V (l) =
∫
Γ
φ [EUτ (l)] dpi,
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where EUτ (l) is the expected utility of the alternative l conditional on the utility function
uτ , andφ(·) concavely transforms EUτ (l).
To establish a more precise correspondence between the value of p and the incomplete
preferences of the receiver, we make further assumptions about the set of the receiver's
utility functions in our decision framework. We assume the receiver has two selfs: a material
payoﬀ driven self and an inequality averse self. Speciﬁcally, given a payoﬀ distribution
(20− a, a), the material payoﬀ driven self has the utility function:
uS(20− a, a) = a.
The inequality aversion self cares only the inequality of the payoﬀ distribution, which is
captured by |20 − 2a|. Note that in our design 20 − a ≥ a, and thus we write the utility
function of the inequality averse self as
uF (x, y) = k − γ(20− 2a),
where k > 0, γ captures the individual's sensitivity to inequality. Such an utility con-
struction for the inequality averse self is consistent with, for example, Fehr and Schmidt
(1999). We derive our benchmark solution according to Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015). In
this model the receiver is extremely cautious and considers only the utility function with
the lowest certainty equivalent. To illustrate the intuition more directly, we have chosen
to work directly with the decision utility instead of with the certainty equivalent.
We ﬁrst consider a simple numerical example for illustration before proceeding to derive
the full solution. Suppose the values of (20 − a, a), k, and γ are constructed such that
uS(20 − a, a) = 1 and uS(0, 0) = 0, and uF (20 − a, a) = 0.2 and uF (0, 0) = 0.8. Let A
denote the acceptance and R denote the rejection of the receiver. The decision utility of
acceptance is
V (A) = min {uS(20− a, a), uF (20− a, a)} = 0.2,
and the decision utility of rejection is
V (R) = min {uS(0, 0), uF (0, 0)} = 0.
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When the receiver randomizes and chooses the lottery(p,A; 1−p,R), where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, the
decision utility is:
V (p,A; (1− p), R) = min {puS(20− a, a) + (1− p)uS(0, 0), puF (0, 0) + (1− p)uF (20− a, a)}
= min {p, 0.8p+ 0.2(1− p)} .
Thus, there exists a unique p∗ = 0.5 that maximizes the decision utility, which is V (0.5, R; 0.5, A) =
0.5. We can see that V (0.5, R; 0.5, A) = 0.5 > V (A) = 0.2 > V (R) = 0. This implies that
the receiver is strictly better oﬀ by randomizing between A and R.
More generally, with our assumption on utility functions, we have:
V (A) = min {uS(20− a, a), uF (20− a, a)} = min {a, k − γ(20− 2a)} ,
and
V (R) = min {uS(0, 0), uF (0, 0)} = min {0, k} = 0.
We would like to focus on payoﬀ distributions (20 − a, a) over which there is a diﬀerent
utility ranking over A and R. Otherwise decision situation becomes trivial; the receiver has
a complete preferences. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in situations where uS(20− a, a) >
uF (20 − a, a) and uS(0, 0) < uF (0, 0). The two conditions imply a > k − γ(20 − 2a) and
thus
V (A) = min {uS(x, y), uF (x, y)} = k − γ(20− 2a).
Proposition 1. When the receiver is indecisive, i.e., uS(20 − a, a) > uF (20 − a, a) and
uS(0, 0) < uF (0, 0), the receiver has a strict preference for randomization.
Proof: When individual randomizes and builds a lottery(p,A; 1−p,R), the decision utility
of such a lottery is:
V (p,A; (1− p), R) =
=
min {puS(20− a, a) + (1− p)uS(0, 0), puF (20− a, a) + (1− p)uF (0, 0)}
min {(pa, k − pγ(20− 2a)} .
The optimal p∗maximizes V (p,A; (1− p), R) can be calculated as
p∗ =
k
20γ − (2γ − 1)a. (3.1)
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The receiver is indecisive when a > k − γ(20− 2a), and in that case we have 0 < p∗ < 1.
With the optimal p∗ the decision utility of (p∗, A; 1− p∗, R) becomes
V (p∗, A; (1− p∗), R) = ka
20γ − (2γ − 1)a.
It is clear that V (p∗, A; (1 − p∗), R) > 0. It can also be shown that ka20γ−(2γ−1)a > k −
γ(20− 2a).2 Thus, when the receiver is indecisive, i.e., uS(20− a, a) > uF (20− a, a) and
uS(0, 0) < uF (0, 0), the receiver has a strict preference for randomization. Q.E.D.
In Equation 3.1 the optimal p∗ the probability of acceptance  increases with a when
γ > 1/2. Experimental evidences suggest that virtually all receivers reject the oﬀer when
a = 0 and accept it when a = 10. This implies γ > 1/2, i.e., the receiver is relatively
sensitive to inequality. In the analysis below we impose γ > 1/2.
Proposition 2. When the receiver is indecisive, i.e., uS(20 − a, a) > uF (20 − a, a) and
uS(0, 0) < uF (0, 0), the WTP for the use of the randomized choice ﬁrst increases with p
∗
when p∗ is below a threshold, and it decreases with p∗ when p∗ exceeds that threshold. .
An intuition of the above proposition is as follows. When a is suﬃciently small (or suﬃ-
ciently large), the receiver would simply reject (or accept, respectively) the oﬀer, and there
is no utility gain from randomization, which implies a WTP of zero. Proposition 1 suggests
that there is a range where the receiver strictly prefers randomization. Together we know
that the relationship between the WTP and p∗ is non-monotonic. For a rigorous proof,
please see Appendix: proof for proposition 2. The utility gain from randomization peaks
at a threshold. It can be shown that the threshold is p∗ = 2γk20γ+2kγ−k , which depends on k
and γ, or more generally on the functional assumptions of diﬀerent selfs. We can however
make some reasonable speculation about this value. Note that the diﬀerence between the
decision utilities of the material payoﬀ-driven self and the inequality averse self when the
receiver accepts a payoﬀ distribution of (20 − a, a) is a + γ(20 − 2a) − k. The diﬀerence
between the decision utilities of the inequality averse self and the material payoﬀ-driven
2To see this, note that k − γ(20 − 2a) = 1
20γ−(2γ−1)a [k − γ(20− 2a)] × [20γ − (2γ − 1)a] =
1
20γ−(2γ−1)a {ka+ γ(2a− 20) [20γ − (2γ − 1)a− k]} < ka20γ−(2γ−1)a . The last inequality follows from 20γ−
(2γ − 1)a− k > 0 and γ(2a− 20) < 0.
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self rejecting a proposal, resulting in a payoﬀ distribution of (0, 0), is k. The conﬂict is
the strongest and the receiver is most indecisive when a+ γ(20− 2a)− k = k, as the two
utility functions exerts equal push on the individual in the opposite direction. We have
p∗ = 0.5 when a+ γ(20− 2a)− k = k. In this sense, the receiver chooses a randomization
probability close to p∗ = 0.5 for the allocation where s/he is the most indecisive.
The intuition of a preference for randomization when preferences are incomplete can be
most easily seen by drawing a comparison with a group decision making where members
have diﬀerent preferences. Suppose a loving couple is thinking of going on a date. The
wife wants to go to see a movie, while the husband prefers to watch a football match.
Together they are indecisive: they want to be together, but there is no easy solution. In
this case, as one can easily imagine, a solution that both would happily accept is to ﬂip
a coin, i.e., a randomized choice. Sure enough, the above example is about two persons
making one decision, not two selfs in one individual to make a decision. But we believe
the same intuition applies. We think the randomized choice oﬀers the acknowledgment of
conﬂicting motives, and it is a fair solution to resolve the intra-personal conﬂict.
4 Experimental results
Overall we ﬁnd that 92% of the subjects (46 out of 50 receivers and 46 out of 50 proposers)
chose p>0 and p<100 in the randomized choice. In other words, more than 90% of the
subjects displayed some degree of indecisiveness, while less than 10% had complete prefer-
ences. Of those with incomplete preferences, they made randomized choice for more than
half of the possible allocations (average numbers of allocations where randomized choice is
made are 53.0% for receivers and 53.5% for proposers). We report the results below. Our
primary focus is on the receivers, thus below we discuss only the results of the receivers,
and move results of the proposers to Appendix: results for proposers.
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4.1 Results on binary choices and randomized choices
Figure 3 reports the relationship between the receiver's acceptance probability and the
proposed share out of BC20. Consistent with previous research, receivers tend to reject
low oﬀers. The median acceptance probability is 0 for allocations giving BC2 or less to the
receivers . When the allocated share to the receiver improves, receivers became increasingly
likely to accept the allocation. The median acceptance probabilities are 0.1 when the
receiver's share is BC3, 0.2 for BC4, 0.5 for BC5 and BC6, 0.7 for BC7, 0.9 for BC8, and 1.0 for BC9
or BC10, respectively. This result is consistent with equation 3.1 in subsection 3.2, as the
acceptance probabilities increase with the receiver's share a.
For each allocation receivers made two choices: the binary choice of either acceptance or
rejection, and the randomized choice of acceptance and rejection. In Figure 3 we also
report the population acceptance ratios  the square with cross in the ﬁgure  in binary
choices for each proposed allocation. In general, the population acceptance ratios are
quite close to the median acceptance probabilities. One way to interpret the results is by
treating the receivers collectively as a representative agent and group members as diﬀerent
selfs with diﬀerent utility functions. The population acceptance ratios can then be seen as
the acceptance probability of the representative agent. In this sense, the decision of the
representative agent with members of diﬀerent preferences mimics the median randomized
choice of the receivers. This idea ﬁts nicely with the fundamental construction of models of
incomplete preferences (Dubra et al., 2004; Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015; Qiu, 2015), where
individuals are assumed to have a set of utility functions.
Comparing the population acceptance ratios with the individual acceptance probabilities
reveals that the population acceptance ratios are in general higher than the individual
acceptance probabilities.3 This seems to suggest that the receivers are more likely to
3Except for a proposed share of BC5. Two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum tests of individual acceptance
probabilities against population acceptance ratios as the means suggest that the diﬀerence is highly sig-
niﬁcant for a proposed share of BC0, BC1, and BC2 (p − value < 0.01), signiﬁcant for a proposed share of
BC7 (p − value < 0.05 ), and weakly signiﬁcant for a proposed share of BC8 (p − value < 0.10), and not
signiﬁcant for a proposed share of BC3, BC4, BC5, BC6, and BC9 (p− value > 0.10 ).
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Figure 3: A boxplot of the receivers' acceptance probability and the proposed share out of
BC20. The squares with cross denote the population acceptance ratios in binary choices.
accept an allocation if they face only binary choices. In the example of Section 3 we
propose to capture the receiver's preference with two selfs: the material payoﬀ driven self
and the inequality averse self. The utilities associated with diﬀerent selfs are uF (20−a, a) =
k+2γ(a−10) and uS(20−a, a) = a, and the diﬀerence of utilities from acceptance between
the two selfs is a(2γ − 1) + k− 20γ, while uF (0, 0) = k and uS(0, 0) = 0 and the diﬀerence
of utilities from rejection between the two selfs is ﬁxed at k. It can easily be veriﬁed
that a(2γ − 1) + k − 20γ < k holds for any 0 ≤ a ≤ 9 and γ > 0. The above result thus
suggests that the two selfs disagree less on the utilities from acceptance than on the utilities
from rejection. This result is consistent with the models on the completion of incomplete
preferences, where individuals, when forced to make a choice, favor the option over which
they are less indecisive, i.e., the diﬀerence of utilities from diﬀerent selfs is smaller.
Our ﬁndings also support our derivation in subsection 3.2 which argues that the receiver
chooses a randomization probability close to 0.5 when the tension is the largest. To see this
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clearly, we examine the data both at the individual receivers level, and at the aggregate
level. At the individual level, for each receiver, we deﬁne the lower threshold a as the
value for which the receiver still rejects but accepts a+ 1 for the ﬁrst time, and the upper
threshold a as the value for which the receiver accepts but rejects a− 1 for the last time.
Thus, at a we have V (A) ≤ V (R), and at a we have V (A) ≥ V (R). 4 We then identify
the receiver's acceptance probabilities at a and a. Those probabilities provide insights
into the connection between the receiver's binary choices and her/his indecisiveness. We
ﬁnd that the median a and a are 5 and 6, respectively (the mean a and a are 4.47 and
5.80, respectively), and the corresponding median acceptance probabilities at a and a are
0.3 and 0.7, respectively (the mean acceptance probabilities at a and a are 0.32 and 0.67,
respectively). On the aggregate level, we observe that at a = 5 or 6 the receivers chose
a median acceptance probability close to 0.5 (0.55 when a = 5, and 0.5 when a = 6.).5
Furthermore, the standard deviations of acceptance probabilities are among the highest
with those two allocations.6 Those results suggest that receivers are relatively conﬁdent
with their choices when a < 5 or a > 6, as their acceptance probabilities are far away from
0.5, and they are highly indecisive for a = 5 or 6, as they choose an acceptance probability
close to 0.5. A more detailed result is reported in Figure 4.
4.2 Decision time and acceptance probability
There is evidence that people make slower decisions as they approach the switching pairs
(see e.g., Chabris et al., 2009). Our data exhibits a similar pattern. Figure 5 depicts the
4For receivers who switch once from rejection to acceptance with the increase of a, a − a = 1. For
receivers who switch multiple times from rejection to acceptance with the increase of a, a − a > 1.
Consider, for example, subject Nr. 18 whose binary choices are (Reject at a ≤ 4; Accept at a = 5; Reject
at 6 ≤ a ≤ 9; Accept at a = 9 or 10), we have a = 4 and a = 9. )
5The acceptance probabilities in our experiment take only the values of {0.1, 0.2, ..., 1.0}. The median
value of 0.55 is due to statistical reporting. Apparently there are exactly the same number of observations
with p ≤ 50 and p ≥ 60. As a result, the median value is reported as 0.55.
6The standard deviations of the acceptance probabilities at a = 5 or 6 are second to that of a = 4.
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Figure 4: Y-axis is the proportion of receivers with the associated acceptance probabilities,
x-axis is the receiver's shares (out of BC20) in the allocation. Diﬀerent line types capture
acceptance probabilities in diﬀerent ranges.
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result.7 As we can see, the median decision time has an inverse U-shaped pattern in relation
to acceptance probabilities. The decision time is shorter when acceptance probabilities
are near 0 or 1, with median decision time stands around 15 seconds (16.37 seconds for
acceptance probabilities of 0 and 14.73 seconds for acceptance probabilities of 1), increases
to 19.00 seconds for acceptance probabilities of p = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 19.31 seconds for
p = 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and tops at 20.73 seconds for acceptance probabilities of p = 0.4, 0.5, 0.6.
The decision time for acceptance probabilities of 0 and 1 is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
those for acceptance probabilities of 0 < p < 1 (two-sided Wilcoxon test, p < 0.01).
We also ﬁnd that median decision time is the highest for allocations between (15,5) and
(13,7), in both binary and randomized choices. This result is inconsistent with individuals
having complete preferences. If individuals randomize because they are indiﬀerent, then
they should spend less time with randomized choices. After all, time is costly and there is
little gain from randomization when the options that subjects face have little diﬀerence in
utilities.
4.3 Results on WTPs
Finally, we report the receiver's WTP for the use the randomized choice when facing an
unequal oﬀer. Recall that each receiver only had to make WTP decision for one randomly
chosen allocation. The receivers were asked how much they would be willing to pay for
the use of the randomized choice when facing an unequal oﬀer. The advantage of this
design is that receivers would be more likely to perceive the choice as a hot play and
thus felt the tension more strongly between the two selfs. The disadvantage, however,
is that we obtain WTP for just one allocation per receiver. This limits the number of
observations. To make statistical tests meaningful and robust, we categorize the receivers
with an acceptance probability of 0.0 as a group, those with an acceptance probability of
1.0 as another group. Among the receiver with an acceptance probability between 0.1 and
0.9, we build three further subgroups: those with an acceptance probability of 0.1, 0.2, and
0.3, those with an acceptance probability of 0.4, 0.5, and 0.6, and those with an acceptance
7We have excluded the ﬁrst period in randomized choices from this part of analysis, as the decision
time in the ﬁrst period included the time for reading the instruction.
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probability of 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9. Such a classiﬁcation is also in line with our results above
and the observation in subsection 3.2 that an acceptance probability in the neighborhood
of 0.5 implies a high degree of indecisiveness, and thus the randomized choice could be
particularly useful in those situations.
Our results are consistent with Proposition 1 which predicts a strictly positive WTP for
the acceptance probability 0 < p < 1.0. Figure 6 reports the boxplot of WTP with respect
to the ﬁve groups of acceptance probabilities. Recall that receivers could choose not to use
the randomized choice or choose to use the randomized choice with a WTP ranging from
BC0 to BC2 with an increment of BC0.2.8 Among the 31 receivers with acceptance probabilities
0 < p < 1, 20 receivers stated a strictly positive WTP and 7 receivers stated a WTP of 0.
The median WTP for the acceptance probability 0 < p < 1.0 is strictly positive, at BC0.40.
In comparison, among the 19 receivers with acceptance probabilities p = 0 or 1, only 1
receivers stated a positive WTP, and the median response for the acceptance probability
of p = 0 or 1.0 is not to use the randomized choice. One-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test
suggests that receivers deciding for an acceptance probability 0 < p < 1.0 have WTPs
signiﬁcantly higher than those of the receivers deciding for an acceptance probability of
p = 0 or p = 1.0 (p < 0.01).
Proposition 2 also suggests that the WTP peaks at certain acceptance probability, and it
decreases as the acceptance probability moves away from this threshold. Our experimental
result conﬁrms this prediction. All 7 receivers with acceptance probabilities p = 0.4, 0.5, 0.6
stated a positive WTP, with a median WTP of BC1.00. In contrast, among 12 receivers
with acceptance probabilities p = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 8 receivers stated a positive WTP, with
a median (mean) WTP of BC0.30, and among 12 receivers with acceptance probabilities
p = 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 5 receivers stated a positive WTP, with a median WTP of BC0.0. One-
sided Wilcoxon rank sum test suggests that receivers deciding for an acceptance probability
of p = 0.4, 0.5, 0.6 have WTPs signiﬁcantly higher than those of the receivers deciding for
an acceptance probability of p = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 or p = 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 (p < 0.01).
8We code the choice of not to use the randomized choice as having a negative WTP. As we report
median responses and use non-parametric tests, the exact value of the negative WTP is irrelevant.
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Figure 6: A boxplot of the WTP of using the randomized choice and the receiver's accep-
tance probability. WTP ranges from BC0 to BC2 with an increment of BC0.2. The WTPs
below 0 imply receivers are not willing to use the randomized choice.
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To address more directly the welfare implication of the randomized choices, we computed
receivers' willingness to pay out of their potential gains in order to resolve the conﬂicts:
the ratio of WTP over the receiver's expected payoﬀ (the acceptance probability times the
receiver's share). We ﬁnd that, among the receivers who at least weakly prefers the use
of randomized choices (WTP≥ 0), the median (mean) ratio for an acceptance probability
of p = 0.4, 0.5, 0.6 is 0.42 (0.36, respectively), the median (mean) ratio for an acceptance
probability of p = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 is 0.42 (0.49, respectively), and the median (mean) ratio for
an acceptance probability of p = 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 is 0.01 (0.10, respectively). Thus, receivers
were willing to pay a signiﬁcant portion of their potential gains for the use of the randomized
choices when the acceptance probability is below 0.7. This result highlights the signiﬁcant
welfare losses when indecisive individuals are forced to make all-or-nothing decisions against
their incomplete preferences.
We have also analyzed the behavior of the proposers. In general, the ﬁndings from the
proposers' decisions are quite similar to those of the receivers. However, the motives behind
the proposers are more complicated. In additional to the conﬂicting motives, they also faces
strategic uncertainty. Their indecisiveness could thus come from both beliefs and tastes.
We have put the results of the proposers to Appendix: results for the proposers.
5 Discussion and conclusion
The assumption of the completeness in preferences plays a critical role in many important
theories, such as EUT, CPT. However, the completeness of the preferences is neither re-
alistic nor normative (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Aumann, 1962) There have
been abundant indications that individuals do not always have complete preferences. For
example, many exhibit inconsistent choices (Camerer, 1989; Starmer and Sugden, 1989),
and these choices occur more often around the indiﬀerence points (Qiu and Steiger, 2011).
Our study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of incomplete preferences-
led indecisiveness in an ultimatum game where individuals face conﬂicting motives in their
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decisions. Our experiment allows receives to make randomized choices regarding accep-
tance and rejection through which they could express their indecisiveness. We ﬁnd that (1)
the vast majority of subjects randomized actively; (2) subjects took longer time to make
strictly randomized decisions; (3) subjects were willing to pay a strictly positive amount
of money to randomize, and they were willing to pay more for randomized choices with
randomizing probabilities close to 0.5 than those with randomizing probabilities close to
0 or 1. These results provide strong evidence for the indecisiveness in choices. The last
ﬁnding, in particular, suggests that there exists signiﬁcant welfare losses when indecisive
individuals are forced to make all-or-nothing decisions against their potentially incomplete
preferences.
While we have chosen to illustrate indecisiveness via the ultimatum game, the approach to
reveal indecisiveness and the implications from our ﬁndings can be applied to other settings
where individuals have to make all-or-nothing decisions while facing multiple conﬂicting
objectives. An area which could beneﬁt from incorporating indecisiveness are studies which
relies on indiﬀerence to obtain measurements, such as the estimation of time preferences,
valuations, risk attitudes, and probability estimates. Confusing indecisiveness with indif-
ference could lead to biases in these estimates. To see the potential biases concretely,
consider a risk attitude elicitation task that is often used in the literature (see, e.g., Ab-
dellaoui, 2000; Holt and Laury, 2002). In the task, subjects face a list of decisions. In each
decision they are required to choose one option out a pair of options. In one format the
ﬁrst option is a lottery, and it is ﬁxed in the entire list. The second option is a monetary
payment with certainty, and the amount is increasing down the list. The lottery is more
attractive than the certainty payment in the ﬁrst few decisions, but the certainty payment
becomes more attractive than the lottery as one progresses down the list.9 An example is
oﬀered in Table 1 in Appendix: an example. In the example anyone who prefers more to
less should pick Option A in the ﬁrst row and pick Option B in the last row. An individual
with a complete and transitive preference switches from Option A to Option B somewhere
in the list, for example, between a certainty payment of BC3.5 and BC4, and between BC3.5
and BC4 an indiﬀerence relationship between the lottery and the certainty payment exists.
9The attractiveness is often obvious as it is based on the ﬁrst degree stochastic dominance criterion.
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That certainty payment is the certainty equivalent of the lottery. An individual with an
incomplete preference but with the same risk attitude would exhibit a similar choice pat-
tern with just one switch. But, due to an aversion to indecisiveness, the individual would
stay a bit longer with the option over which the valuation is relatively easy to assess, which
is often the less risky or the certainty option (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015; Qiu, 2015). For
example, the individual would switch from Option A to Option B between a certainty
payment of BC3 and BC3.5. If, however, this individual with an incomplete preference is
taken as one having a complete preference, s/he would be estimated to be more risk averse
than s/he actually is. Based only on the behavioral observations, one cannot distinguish
one individual with a complete preference and higher risk aversion from another who has
an incomplete preference but is less risk averse. Such identiﬁcation problem exists in any
method that relies on indiﬀerence (see e.g., Andersen et al., 2006).
The second area where allowing indecisiveness would be useful is in raising voting rates.
Voting often requires individuals to make diﬃcult tradeoﬀs between candidates or poli-
cies. Indecisiveness occurs when these options embody conﬂicting values or beliefs. When
individuals are indecisive, a natural thing to do is tochoose the safer option of not to
do anything (Masatlioglu and Ok, 2005), i.e., not to vote. If voters were provided with a
randomization mechanism and were allowed to vote probabilistically, their decision utility
increases, and they are consequently more likely to vote.
The third area where indecisiveness is possible and randomization is beneﬁcial is in the
selection of job candidates. It is common for a job proﬁle to have multiple criteria, and
rarely would we see a candidate dominates in all criteria. As a result, indecisiveness arises.
Without a randomization possibility, it can be shown that a small favoritism could go a
long way as to select 100% of times the candidate who enjoys the bias. When given a
randomization possibility, however, candidates who are biased against might also have a
chance to be selected. 10
10To see this concretely, suppose there are two candidates - A and B - who need to be assessed according
to two criteria. Suppose the employer always favors slightly the male candidate - candidate A here - in the
following way: u1(A) = 1 and u1(B) = 0, and u2(A) = 0.2 (instead of u2(A) = 0 should the employer is
not biased) and u2(B) = 1, where ui(·) denotes criterion i. When the employer has to pick one candidate
and applies the cautious rule as in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) to make the ﬁnal choice, candidate A will
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Appendix: results for proposers
In general results for proposers are similar to those of receivers. Figure 7 gives a boxplot
of the proposer's probability proposing the equal allocation, depending on the proposer's
share out of BC20 in the unequal allocation. Proposers actively randomize, in particular
when the proposers' share is between BC12 to BC18 in the unequal allocation. . It seems
proposers are most indecisive when the proposers' share is BC14 in the unequal allocation.
Similarly, the group averages in binary choices are quite close the median probabilities in
the randomized choices. A more detailed result is reported in Figure 8.
Figure 8: The y-axis is the proportions of proposers, x-axis the proposer's share out of BC20
in the share of unequal allocation. Diﬀerent colors represent the proposer's probabilities
to propose the equal allocation (10, 10).
Similar to the results of receivers, proposers who chose a proposing probability of p = 0
or p = 100 for the equal allocation have WTPs signiﬁcantly lower than those of proposers
choosing a proposing probability of 0 < p < 100 (p < 0.01). There is one signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the behavior of the receivers and that of the proposers. The proposers
with proposing probabilities of p = 0.1, 0.2, or 0.3 have WTPs higher than those with
proposing probabilities of p = 0.4, 0.5, or 0.6, though the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (two-
sided Wilcoxon rank sum test, p > 0.10).
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Figure 7: A boxplot of the proposer's probability proposing the equal allocation, depending
on the proposer's share out of BC20 in the unequal allocation. The squares with cross denote
the population ratios of proposing the equal allocation in binary choices.
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Figure 9: The WTP of using the randomized choice and its associated probability of
proposing the equal allocation (10, 10). WTP ranges from BC0 to BC2 with an increment of
BC0.2. The WTP below 0 implies receivers are not willing to use the randomized choice.
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Appendix: proof for proposition 2:
Proof: It is clear that with a suﬃciently small a the utility of acceptance is smaller than
the utility of rejection, i.e., V (A) = k − γ(20 − 2a) ≤ V (R) = 0. This gives a ≤ 20γ−k2γ .
Note p∗ = k20γ−a(2γ−1) , using p
∗ to deﬁne the value of a, and we have a = 20γ−k/p
∗
2γ−1 . Notice
also that a ≤ 20γ−k2γ , and thus 20γ−k/p
∗
2γ−1 ≤ 20γ−k2γ . This deﬁnes the upper threshold of p∗ as
p∗ ≤ 2γk20γ+2kγ−k . When p∗ is below this threshold we have:
∆V = V (p∗, A; (1− p∗), R)−max {V (A), V (R)} = p∗a = 20p
∗γ − k
2γ − 1 .
Since ∆V increases with p∗, the utility gain from randomization increases with p∗ when
p∗ ≤ 2γk20γ+2kγ−k . The WTP increases with the utility gain, and thus the WTP increases
with p∗ when p∗ ≤ 2γk20γ+2kγ−k .
With a suﬃciently large a the utility of acceptance should be larger than the utility of
rejection, i.e., V (A) = k−γ(20−2a) > V (R) = 0. Similarly, we have a = 20γ−k/p∗2γ−1 ≥ 20γ−k2γ ,
and this deﬁnes the lower threshold of p∗ as p∗ ≥ 2γk20γ+2kγ−k . When p∗ is above this
threshold we have:
∆V = V (p∗, A; (1−p∗), R)−max {V (A), V (R)} = 20p
∗γ − k
2γ − 1 −
[
k − 20γ + 2γ(20γ − k/p
∗)
2γ − 1
]
Taking the ﬁrst-order derivative of ∆V with respect to p∗ gives, for p∗ < 1, that:11
γ
p∗2 (2γ − 1)
(
20p∗2 − 2k) ≤ γ
p∗2 (2γ − 1)
(
20p∗2 − 20) < 0.
The negative value of the ﬁrst-order derivative implies a decreasing utility gain from ran-
domization with p∗ when p∗ is above 2γk20γ+2kγ−k . Similarly, it follows that the WTP de-
creases with the decreasing utility gain from randomization when p∗ ≥ 2γk20γ+2kγ−k . Q.E.D.
11The latter inequality is obtained by recognizing that p∗ = k/10 when a = 10. To make sure p∗ = 1
when a is suﬃciently close to 10, we must have k ≥ 10.
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Appendix: an example
Option A Option B
Choices with a Choices with
complete preference incomplete preference
0.5, BC10; 0.5, BC0 BC0 2A B 2A B
0.5, BC10; 0.5, BC0 BC2 2A B 2A B
0.5, BC10; 0.5, BC0 BC3 2A B 2A B
0.5, BC10; 0.5, BC0 BC3.5 2A B A B2
0.5, BC10; 0.5, BC0 BC4 A B2 A B2
0.5, BC10; 0.5, BC0 BC4.5 A B2 A B2
0.5, BC10; 0.5, BC0 BC5 A B2 A B2
0.5, BC10; 0.5, BC0 BC6 A B2 A B2
0.5, BC10; 0.5, BC0 BC8 A B2 A B2
0.5, BC10; 0.5, BC0 BC10 A B2 A B2
Table 1: The risk attitudes elicitation task. Option A is a lottery and is ﬁxed in the table.
Option B pays out a monetary amount with certainty, and the amount increases down the
list. Anyone prefers more to less should pick Option A in the ﬁrst row and pick Option B
in the last row. An individual with a complete preference might switch from Option A to
Option B between a certainty payment of BC3.5 and BC4. An individual with an incomplete
preference with the same risk attitude might, due to an aversion to incomplete preferences,
switch from Option A to Option B between a certainty payment of BC3 and BC3.5.
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Appendix: decision screens.
Figure 10: The elicitation of the proposer's binary choices. The value of a ∈ {0, 1, ..., 9},
and the sequence is random.
Figure 11: The elicitation of the receiver's binary choices. The value of a ∈ {0, 1, ..., 9},
and the sequence is random.
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Figure 12: The elicitation of the proposer's randomized choices. The probabilities are in
an increment of 10%, p = {0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, ..., 100%}. When the slider is moved, the p
under Allocation 1, 100 − p% under Allocation 2, and the p% above the slider all change
to reﬂect the decision.
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